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Foreword  
This publication1 comes out of the Strategic Program for Research on Globalization and 
Internationalization: welfare, work, legitimacy and globalization, at the Stein Rokkan Centre for 
Social Studies at Bergen University Research Foundation. This program is designed as a 
University of Bergen research network, and its primary area of activity is the study of 
changes in welfare and labor market institutions as they are played out in the debate on 
globalization and internationalization. 
Issues of distribution, regulation and fairness are central to the program, which 
incorporates research in sociology, political science, economics, history and philosophy. 
One basic premise for program research is that focusing on welfare and labor market 
institutions can provide important insights into other areas of society and that it can also 
shed light on other globalization issues, such as the status of the nation state and 
conditions for democratic governance. 
 
 
 
Nina Berven has a cand.polit. (master’s degree) in political science from the University of 
Bergen. In the fall of 2001 she was awarded a doctoral grant under the Globalization 
Program and this publication is a revised and expanded presentation of her doctoral 
research project. The project head is Professor Stein Kuhnle. 
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Abstract  
The theme of this paper is how to engage in conceptual traveling while simultaneously 
avoid conceptual stretching: At the one hand we need concepts general enough to grasp 
essential features of the national contexts under investigation, yet at the other hand we 
run the risk of using concepts broad enough to grasp everything – and thereby nothing.  
This is a major challenge if we understand comparisons and concepts as basic tools 
in social sciences. Insufficient tools do not only complicate the research process e.g. by 
lacking or inadequate information, it also cause difficulties in terms of explanations and 
presentation of analysis. The likelihood of translations-errors, over- and under- 
interpretations is a continuous risk in comparative oriented research. That is, we either 
lack the conceptual tools necessary to get a grip on what is really «out there«, or we 
frame the phenomenon differently than in its original context.  
Dilemmas like these are to a great extent to be explained by essential features of 
social science, where the researcher not only is part of the context being researched but 
also has to deal with the interpretations of the units under investigations. In the paper I 
concretize some of these challenges by examples from my own comparative oriented 
research, and discuss different options in dealing with them.  
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Sammendra g  
Dette notatet handler om hvordan å drive det Sartori (1970:1034)  betegner som 
conceptual traveling og samtidig unngå conceptual stretching: Begreper må være generelle nok 
til å kunne brukes på tvers av enheter, uten at begrepene av den grunn blir så løse og 
upresise at de sier alt og ingenting. Dette er en høyst aktuell utfordring all den tid vi 
forstår komparasjon og begreper som grunnleggende samfunnsvitenskapelige 
verktøy.Dårlige verktøy skaper problemer for forskningen, i form av ufullstendige data, 
mangelfulle analyser og fremstillinger.   
Den overordnede problemstillingen kan formuleres på følgende måte: Er det «det 
samme» som sammenlignes ved komparasjon på tvers av nasjonale og politiske kontekster? Som en 
utdypning vil jeg først diskutere begrepsbruk i sammenheng med mitt pågående 
doktorgradsprosjekt. En kort gjennomgang av potensielle oversettelsesproblemer i 
forhold til   sentrale begreper som «velferd» og «velferdsstat» bidrar til å konkretisere 
og aktualisere problemstillingen. Samtidig blir behovet for å koble det fagspesifikke og 
det generelt vitenskapsteoretiske synliggjort: Kan vi i det hele tatt kan gjøre gode eller 
«rette» fortolkninger av verden, eller iallfall vite at de er gode eller «rette»?   
Dette spørsmålet fører frem mot paperets hoveddel: forbindelsen mellom 
problemstillingen og vitenskapsteoriens term om den hermeneutiske sirkel. Mens 
«hermeneutikk» har å gjøre med fortolkning av meningsfulle fenomener og beskrivelser 
av vilkårene for at forståelse av mening skal være mulig, viser «den hermeneutiske 
sirkel» til forbindelsene mellom det som skal fortolkes og forskerens forforståelse. Ved 
å ligge i skjæringspunktet mellom flere sentrale vitenskapsteoretiske diskusjoner kan 
termen være en mulighet til å komme bak mer fagspesifikke debatter og gi alternative 
innfallsvinkler til spørsmålet om hvorvidt det er «det samme» som sammenlignes ved 
tverrnasjonal komparasjon. På bakgrunn av den  vitenskapsteoretiske gjennomgangen i 
essayet blir oversettelsesproblematikken på ny trukket frem og diskutert. Hvilke 
forskningsmessige utfordringer står prosjektet mitt ovenfor og i hvilken grad fungerer 
vitenskapsteorien og hermeneutikken som svar på disse utfordringene?   
Avslutningsvis tar jeg opp igjen den innledende problemstillingen Er det ’det samme’ 
som sammenliknes ved tverrnasjonal komparasjon?. Konklusjonen er nei, strengt tatt ikke og 
jeg summerer opp den teoretiske, praktiske og forskningsmessige betydningen av dette.  
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Introduction  
To compare is a basic activity in science as well as in everyday life. The focus of this 
paper is social science however, that more systematically has developed comparison as a 
primary method and source for knowledge. To a great extent social science deals with 
interpretations and meanings, and hereby comparison can be viewed a basic tool to get grip 
on the social world. In relating one phenomenon to another, the researcher achieves a 
different kind of understanding than if viewed in isolation. Persons as well as policy 
areas, institutions and states are in principle comparable; and number of units and level 
of abstraction can vary substantially. In other words: a comparative approach is broadly 
compound as well as broadly applicable. 
Yet there are also important practical and methodological challenges associated with 
a comparative research design. The starting point for this paper is how to secure 
conceptual traveling while simultaneously avoid conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970:1034): What 
needed are concepts broad enough to be applicable across units, without being so 
general that they say everything – and thereby nothing. The distinction between 
traveling and stretching touch upon the vary basis of how to achieve, as well as produce, 
knowledge: It highlights central aspects of the relationship between the researcher and 
the «reality» being researched, and between our understandings and our research. Not 
only is the social scientist a part of the social reality to be interpreted; the other actors 
taking part are also continuously interpreting this reality. And when it comes to cross-
national research, the social scientist is also bringing his or her cultural and cognitive 
«baggage» to the reality being analyzed.  
Based on this my initial question goes as follows: Do we compare the «the same» 
phenomenon when we compare across national and political contexts? In order to elaborate this the 
first part of the paper is focusing on some challenges I meet in my own research. The 
aim of this is twofold. First it serves to concretize some of the rather general points 
being discussed later on. This is also the reason why I deal with my considerations 
regarding cases and design in some length. Second it serves to throw light upon the 
relevance of linking specific disciplinary approaches or -traditions to general scientific 
subjects: How are we to make accurate and relevant interpretations of the social world, 
or at least know whether they are accurate and relevant?   
 In order to deal with this, the second part of the paper is aimed at relating the 
initial question of cross-national comparability to a hermeneutic approach, or more 
specific to the term «hermeneutic circle» (Gadamer 1960, Krogh 2000). While 
«hermeneutic» has to do with interpretations of meaningful phenomenon and the 
conditions which on meaning is made possible, «the hermeneutic circle» links the social 
world under investigation with the social scientists’ basic assumptions and 
understandings. These terms are helpful in moving beyond more disciplinary debates 
and offers alternative approaches to my initial questions. This also contributes in 
throwing new lights over the problem of translation-errors both in my own project and 
more generally. Based on the foregoing discussions I conclude by saying that actually we 
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are not comparing «the same» in cross-national comparisons and sum up the theoretical 
and practical implications of this.  
People,  not their  eyes,  see2 
My theme and questions then to a great extent focus on use of concepts, in that 
concepts are tools to understand the world. We see through concepts so to speak. 
Occasionally this and the continuous consideration between traveling and stretching 
(Sartori 1970) have resulted in disciplinary controversies over whether comparative 
oriented research is possible or at least relevant.3 But what does it really mean to «see 
through concepts» and how are we to move beyond more disciplinary discussions?  
Basically, seeing through concepts implies that our views of the world necessarily 
build upon certain assumptions. Every society and social system requires a certain extent 
of shared perceptions etc. For example; a concept and phenomenon like the «welfare 
state» requires a (at least minimal level of) shared perceptions over what are ought to be 
societal responsibilities and tasks – and what does not. The concept also intersects and 
calls for other concepts like rights/duties, public/private, individual /society etc. 
Eventual problems first occur if we apply our understandings of «the welfare state» on 
other (welfare-) states, a point soon to be elaborated. In doing so we run the risk of 
ending up with «empty» concepts; that is we ignore central aspects of a phenomenon 
because they are not included in our conceptual apparatus. Also we run the risk of over- 
or under-interpret what is really «out there». That is, that due to our conceptual 
understandings we stress a phenomenon more or less than in its initial context.    
Strictly speaking the questions «Do we compare the ‘the same’ phenomenon when we compare 
across national and political contexts?» and «Is what we compare comparable» have quite different 
meanings. Two phenomenons are never identical – and if they were there were no sense 
in comparing them. Although they may have features that make us interested in 
comparing, either because they seem «unexpectably» different or similar. This has been 
characterized as most different and most similar system design (Przeworski and Teune 1970). A 
most different system design implies that the similarities we find when comparing units 
that differs sharply in most aspects are highly relevant; they are despite of rather than 
because of. Several (potential) explanatory factors can be excluded or kept «constant» 
already at first place, in contrast to a most similar system design. Here we compare units 
being as similar as possible, based on the assumption that the differences then appearing 
are highly significant. In other words, choice of design is closely related to what we 
intend to explain; similarities across differences, or differences across similarities. 
Regardless of design however abstraction is an important precondition for all 
comparison. When comparing we stress some aspects at expenses of others: Specific 
similarities or differences are viewed as relevant while others are being ignored or 
defined as irrelevant. Then it is crucial to questioning what is underpinning the 
abstractions.   
Challenges related to abstractions and translations, as well as over- and under- 
interpretations are highly relevant for social sciences. To a great extent these sciences are 
based on the assumptions of human activities and the results thereof are meaningful 
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phenomenons but nevertheless in needs of interpretations to be understandable (Gilje and 
Grimen 1993). In that social science can be viewed as an interpretative and meaning-
oriented process, and thereby as a hermeneutic process. Another important 
characteristic is the scientist being part of, and also needs to deal with, a social world 
where the social actors to be researched upon, already have their own notions and 
interpretations of causal relations, problems, solutions etc. By that, social sciences, in 
contrast to for example natural sciences, is characterized by a kind of double-hermeneutic 
(Giddens 1993). But before dealing with hermeneutic more generally, it will be useful to 
concretize these initial issues by relating it to my own doctoral research.  
Two states,  four welfare programs and 
various levels of  controversy  
The ongoing thesis, with the preliminary title: National Politics and Global Ideas? Welfare, 
Work and Legitimacy in Norway and the United States deals with the parliamentary debates 
over four contemporary welfare programs; two in Norway (cash for care and transitional 
allowance) and two in the United States (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)). Despite different national contexts 
the policy debates seem to point towards arguments, principles and ideological cleavages 
not to be captured solely by traditional welfare typologies (Esping-Andersen1990). 
Apparently then we deal with ideas and perceptions traveling across countries and 
welfare-regimes. Briefly we can assume that by analyzing how different arrangements are 
being debated in different national contexts we are also able to «unveil» deep-rooted 
values in these contexts. Even though Norway and the United States stand out as «most 
different» cases in several aspects, this is especially the case in terms of welfare models- 
or regimes. Here the U.S. is viewed as something near to the prototype of the liberal 
welfare regime which «in their contemporary forms reflect a political commitment to minimize the state, 
to individualize risks, and to promote market solutions» (Esping-Andersen 1999:74–75). 
Norway on the other hand (as well as the two other Scandinavian countries) is virtually 
synonymous with the social democratic welfare regime, characterized by universalism, 
comprehensive risk coverage, generous benefits levels, and egalitarianism (ibid:78). 
Another hallmark is de-commodification, or the effort to minimize dependency upon 
market. 
In both countries however contemporary political debates are often accused of being 
if not actually non existent, than at least dull and based on temporary cases rather than 
larger ideological or value oriented questions. This is also the case when it comes to 
welfare issues and -policy. People are said to engage only in issues that gain their own 
(economical) interests and in other respect acknowledge status quo. If this is the general 
picture however, my project demonstrates that there are plenty of pieces that do not fit 
in.  
In Norway prior to the implementation of the 1998 cash for care reform, there were 
comprehensive and heated debates among politicians, mass media and the public in 
general. Very briefly cash for care is a universal reform were all parents to children age 
one to three years old can choose to receive 3000 NOK (approximately $430) per 
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month in order to achieve more flexibility and freedom of choice in organizing child 
care. The only criterion for taking use of the program is not simultaneously taking use 
of state sponsored childcare services, which in practice mean all Norwegian 
kindergartens. Except from that, the parents are free to organize their childcare needs 
and spend the payment as they like to.  
Not since voting over EU membership in 1994 has the political temperature been 
higher and the cleavages clearer then when it came to cash for care. Quite contradictory 
to the general consensus oriented and rather modest political climate characterizing 
Norway it was like everyone, and not only the parents involved, had very strong opinions 
on this issue. Why, I started to wonder, did everyone get so involved in a program that 
after all is optional and matters to a relatively small group of the population for a 
relatively limited period of time? Probable, I figured out, it had something to do with 
the cash for care reform challenging not only the traditional «work line» (arbeidslinjen) in 
Norwegian welfare policy but also fundamental cleavages and values over the relations 
between public – private, individual- society, gender roles and notions of equality etc.  
This called my attention to United States and the 1996 welfare reform. Here in 
moving from AFDC to TANF, or «from welfare to work», wage work became like a 
mantra for ending welfare dependency, idleness, teenage pregnancies, out of wedlock 
births, or what is also been labeled «the culture of poverty» (Murray 1984, Mead 1986, 
1992). Despite welfares` controversial status, the 1996 welfare reform is in general 
viewed a success among mass medias, politicians and the general public. Mostly this is 
due to more than 50 percent reduction in the number of welfare recipients in the first 
five years after the reform and a marked increase in employment.  
Why is it then, my next question turned out, that in the late 1990`s the «women-
friendly» Norway experienced a welfare reform not aimed at increasing gender equality 
through labor, while simultaneously the more «traditional» United States implemented a 
reform were «wage work» was the key word. Could it have something to do with the 
programs being directed to different groups? That is, every parent with children age one 
to three are principally eligible for cash-for-care, even though the majority of users turn 
out to be two parents families. On the other hand, only poor single-parent families – 
that is poor single mothers – are eligible for TANF. To what extent do different social 
groups meet different political expectations and experience various level of choice (or 
lack thereof) when it comes to how to organize towards state and market?  Do for 
example married or cohabitant parents (mothers) have larger rooms for maneuvers than 
single ones, and if so how and why?    
In order to meet these questions I realized that two welfare programs, one from each 
country, were too scarce. What were needed were other welfare programs within each 
country that pointed in opposite directions than the original ones. In order to make the 
comparison relevant and be able to answer the questions I am interested in, they also 
had to be directed to individuals based on their parental and/or marital status, and I 
wanted women to constitute the clear majority of users. As far as possible I also 
searched for variations in level of controversy: Having two relative controversial welfare 
programs and adding two relative uncontroversial ones, opens for contrasts and create a 
kind of «most different system design» – also within each country. That is how 
transitional allowance and earned income tax credit entered the thesis.  
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While cash for care was being heavily debated and then implemented in Norway, 
transitional allowance, a cash and service-based program for single parent, had undergone 
major changes without any public debate at all (actually it happened so quietly that I, not 
particular involved with the issue, noticed it by coincident a few years later when 
studying cash- for- care). From the implementation in 1964 and until 1998 being lone 
parents with limited income and youngest child under the age of 10, was the only 
criterion for receiving transitional allowance. More generous transfers though for a 
shorter period of time characterized the changes in 1998. All single parents with limited 
income and the youngest child under three years old were still eligible to transitional 
allowance, independently of eventual paid work. From then on however, wage-work or 
education is an absolute claim for until two years more of further transfers, as long as 
the youngest child is under the age of eight. Or in other words: «The new system maintained 
that recipients of allowance should be more active in the labour market and that no one should receive 
allowance for more than three years (with the possibility of an extension of two more years if the recipient 
was in education)» (Fjær and Syltevik 2002:x). What makes major restrictions in a mean-
tested program for single parent only so unproblematic or uncontested compared to a 
contemporary universal program where people can choose to receive money?   After all 
the Norwegian welfare state have always joined a very high level of popular support, and 
in general people want more, not less universal welfare programs  (Hatland et.al. 2001).  
Maybe finding a relatively uncontroversial U.S. welfare program would help 
explaining this apparently paradox? This turned out to be a difficult task however, 
especially when searching for welfare in the American sense of the term. Yet if 
searching for «welfare» in the broader Norwegian /Scandinavian meaning of the term, I 
would overcome this obstacle and be able to go on with my questions. As long as I had 
one «U.S. oriented» reform (transitional allowance; mean tested and for low income 
single parent only) in the Norwegian context, I figured out, I could also apply a more 
«European oriented» one in the U.S. context. Even though EITC is not part of the 
safety net associated with welfare, it has been characterized as «A real Antipoverty 
Program», it lack the stigma of public assistance, it is continuously being expanded and 
indexed for inflation, and it enjoy high level of support and popularity. Being a federal 
tax relief as well as a supplementary earning it is designed to solve the paradox of the 
«working poor», while simultaneously making low paid work more attractive than 
welfare.  
Among my basic assumptions then is that in analyzing how different arrangements 
are being debated in different national contexts allows «unveiling» deep-rooted values 
in these contexts as well as highlighting the relation between the cross-national at the 
one hand and the national at the other. Yet, as with comparative cross-national research 
in general the project faces some basic challenges related to the introductory issue of 
stretching versus traveling. Being a Norwegian when doing research and data selection in 
the United States for example may contribute in me seeing and stressing differently than 
an American.4 This of course may have the advantage of alternative approaches and 
creative analysis, although it can also result in observations, interpretations and 
presentations that either over- or under-interpret what is «really» out there. The 
Norwegian concept «velferd» is not equal to the U.S. concept «welfare», and 
contradictory to the Norwegian «velferdsstat», the concept «welfare state» is not 
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common usage in the United States.5 So at the one hand concepts are indispensable 
tools when interpreting and understanding the social world, while at the other hand they 
are closely linked to cultural and cognitive views and beliefs. We need to be aware of 
these contextual differences in order to avoid «emptying» the concepts in use. Empty or 
imprecise concepts imply inferior tools for research: Not only will we have difficulties to 
translating from one context to another; it will also be difficult to get an adequate 
understanding of any context at all.  
According to Sartori however this does not imply that we have to give up 
comparison, neither that comparative methods are inferior to other methods of 
research. Yet, «the wider the world under investigation, the more we need conceptual tools that are 
able to travel» (Sartori 1970:1034). It is important to start with clear and well-defined 
concepts, because we cannot measure anything if we do not hold clear perceptions of 
what we are to measure. Simultaneously our concepts are not to be so specific that 
comparison becomes impossible. In other words, all research continuously need to 
consider between generality and contents, which can be characterized as moving along a 
ladder of abstraction (Sartori 1970:1040).  This lead back to the initial question of whether 
it is the «the same» phenomenon we compare when comparing across national and 
political contexts. What is the value of hermeneutic, that is interpretations of meanings 
and descriptions of the circumstances under which this is possible, when it comes to the 
translation-problems being emphasized in the foregoing pages. Is it a supplement to 
more discipline-specific theory?  
Hermeneutic as a basis for scientif ic  
knowledge  
       We do not ask «What’ s that?» of every passing bicycle6 
Hermeneutic is not a «method» in the conventional sense of the word, offering a 
«recipe» on how to perform certain scientific related activities. Rather it can be viewed 
as a common scientific basis (Krogh 2000:237). Thereby a hermeneutic approach is no 
substitute for specific disciplinary approaches. The point is rather that a disciplinary 
approach itself does not guarantee precise and relevant knowledge either. This is central 
work in Hans-Georgs Gadamers’ Wahrheit und Methode (1960), a hermeneutic work often 
considered a break with Descartes’ teaching (Krogh 2000:245).  
«Doubt» is the essential feature of Descartes` project. By doubting everything that in 
principle is doubtable, one will end up with a «core» of absolutely truths detached from 
cultural, social and historical preconditions the arguments goes. This detachment will 
then serve as a guarantor for a reliable scientific base of knowledge (Skirbekk and Gilje 
1987:274). The critic of Gadamer have to do with this project moving in wrong 
direction, as well as being impossible in practice: We never start from «scratch» so to 
speak, and this is not an ideal either. Quite the contrary, our biases are the very 
preconditions for achieving an adequate understanding: We have to start somewhere in 
order to understand the past or different political and cultural systems. According to 
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Gadamer then there is really no other or better starting point then the knowledge 
already there, even though it results from our biases. 
This pragmatism reveals a parallel between Sartori and Gadamer : Being more or less 
«captured» in context-specific concepts and notions is not an obstacle but a precondition 
for being able to interpret other cultural, political or historical contexts. And while 
Sartori prescribes a flexible or revisable clarification of concepts, Gadamer stresses how 
out preconditions or biases continuous face critiques and corrections when meeting 
«the real world». This also shows the relevance of linking hermeneutic at a rather 
general level and comparison at a more specific or disciplinary level: A hermeneutic 
approach stresses how our conceptual and cognitive «baggage» is related to specific 
contexts; an important corrective to political sciences` analyzes across national, political 
and cultural contexts.  
The hermeneutic circle  
What then, the question turns out, when I in my own doctoral project compare different 
«realities» (i.e. political and national contexts) and according to hermeneutic theory am 
unable to detach from my own? The relations between the researcher with his/her pre-
understandings and the reality being research upon are in the very core of the term 
«hermeneutic circle» presented in the figure below. Yet it is important to stress that in 
practice this circle is more of a continuous process than a static tool one choose to take 
us of or not. The transitions from one phase to another will thereby be more fluid then 
what the figure allows for. But the figure demonstrates quite well how we continuously 
adjust our understanding to the «real world» and achieve new and extended knowledge. 
This new knowledge in turn contributes to us having another view of the world then 
what we had at the first place, and so on.  
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    1) Interpreter/researcher 
                                 (with cul. and pol. biases) 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                           2) «The world»; 
4) «The world»                                                                what is to be interpreted      
(Interpreted with extended understandings) 
  
                            
 
 
  
 3) Interpreter /researcher         
                              (with revised biases)                                
 
 
Figure 1. Gadamers version of the hermenutic circle 7  
 
This figure also demonstrates the importance of biases and pre-understandings. Rather 
than being obstacles, they are necessities for being able to enter the circle – and thereby 
for being able to make meaningful interpretations and statements of the surrounding 
world. The following discussion is based on the circles’ two main components – that is 
what we are to interpret and what we interpret with – in order to find out how the 
interactions between these add the initial question of whether we compare ‘the same’ 
when comparing across nations.  
What is  to be interpreted; the social  
world as an interpretative object  
As already mentioned, research within the social sciences is to a large extent a process of 
interpretation and search for meanings. The units under investigation are most likely 
social systems or -institutions like states, organizations etc. with distinct norms, values, 
rules and so on. Within these units there are actors (groups or individuals) with their 
own interpretations of the situations they are parts of. 
Due to the initial issue of whether we compare «the same» in cross-national 
comparisons the question of which realities are regarded valid (and which one invalid) 
becomes highly relevant. Put another way; is it the researcher or the ones being 
researched who has the most «valid» or «realistic» reality? There are two major 
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traditions for approaching this question. One tradition, represented by Durkheim, states 
that the role of the researcher is to forget about the actors and search for the actual and 
latent explanations on why a society is the way it is. Another tradition, represented by 
Weber, states the opposite: The role of the researcher is to get grip on and build the 
research upon the actors’ own interpretations and descriptions. Still there is also a third 
approach, represented by Giddens, searching for direct interpretations as well as 
reconstructions by the researcher. The following pages are not aimed at an extensive 
presentation of Durkheim, Weber and Giddens, but rather to demonstrate the 
importance, relevance and conflicting views of how an interpretative comparative 
method is to be carried out.  
D u r k h e i m :  T h e  a c t o r s  a s  « d i s t u r b e r s »  
A «durkheimian» approach is based on the actual and contemporary situation. No 
matter how multiple and complex this may appear it always builds upon a distinct, 
underlying structure. For Durkheim, these elementary forms are the focus of interest and a 
comparative approach is first and foremost the mean to achieve depth-based 
knowledge. In that the «durkheimian» approach is closely linked to natural science 
research: If the social sciences intend to be scientific, they need to overcome the focus 
of uniqueness and details: It is the societies themselves – or the social species – that are to 
be studied. Societal phenomenons are real phenomenons and thereby details and 
individuals becomes of minor importance. Quite the contrary the role of the scientist is 
to move beyond the apparently and manifest, and search for the latent and authentic 
(Durkheim 1972, Gilje and Grimen 1993). For Durkheim then only the scientist has 
access to what is «really there», and consequently to the comparability of the social 
world. 
W e b e r :  T h e  a c t o r s  a s  t h e  p r i m a r y  s o u r c e  
o f  k n o w l e d g e  
Contradictory to Durkheim, Weber claims that the societal complexity only allows for 
strictly limited generalizations within the social sciences. What characterize social 
science are the intentions of explaining historical and contemporary complexity, rather 
than unveiling social «laws» and regularities. Therefore a comparative approach is 
always valuable, but in order to really understand a society the scientist need to go 
deeper: Because a society basically is nothing more than the sum of its individuals, all 
meaningful research and analysis are to be rooted in these individuals. 
Yet, eventual limited generalizations are possible through ideal-types; that is a kind of 
«model» on which the actual and complex world can be held up against. In that the 
ideal-types are tools to understand the «divergent» social world (Weber 1971, Gilje and 
Grimen 1993). Simultaneously, they become comparative tools as the scientist stress some 
features (similar or different) at expense of others. By this the ideal-types also contribute 
in making the question of whether or not we are comparing «the same» less urgent, or 
at least in placing it on a more general level of abstraction. 
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Summing up, both Durkheim and Weber view comparison as a feature distinguishing 
social science from for example history and philosophy. Both theorists also understand 
the social world as complex, but while Durkheim searches for the underlying and 
constant in this complexity, Weber focuses on and intends to explain the plurality itself. 
Based on this, Giddens` position becomes something in between.  
G i d d e n s :  A c t o r s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  a n d  
s c i e n t i f i c  r e c o n s t r u c t i o n  
Central to Giddens is how social actors contribute in constituting the social world they 
are part of. This happens through their concepts and understanding, and whether or not 
the actors are aware of it. An example: our notions and opinions over gender biases 
within the work-sphere influence directly upon gender-relations. If we see these 
relations as non-existent or unproblematic we will, according to Giddens position, think 
and act differently than if we see gender biases as existent and problematic. Thereby the 
attitudes and actions of actors are central in creating the social world, which in turn is to 
be interpreted by the social scientist. Both parts are equal in terms of importance validity 
and relevance, and contribute equally to the social phenomena to be interpreted and 
mediated. The role of the scientist then is to relate directly to the social actors in order 
to get grip on their concepts and understandings, while simultaneously interpreting this 
from his or her research-questions and knowledge.  
This brief presentation of Durkheim, Weber and Giddens demonstrate how 
abstractions and selections are central to comparative research as well as social science 
in general. However, the three theorists have different views on what is to be the basis 
for this. Neither do they offer a clear answer to the question of whose reality to be the 
valid one in social science research; an important point for the further discussion.  
What are the interpretative tools;  biases 
and the knowledge at hands  
Seeing is not only the having of a visual experience; it is also the way in which the 
visual experience is had8 
When interpreting we necessarily begin with some ideas of what to look for. Principally 
this goes for any science, but is of special relevance for comparative-based social 
science. In what follows I will discuss some central components in the pre-
understanding of social actors. Important questions are to which extent pre-
understanding and -knowledge can be made explicit; that is what it is based on and its 
relevance for the question of cross-national comparability.  
Central to the hermeneutic approach is that meaningful phenomenons only make 
sense (are meaningful) in context. A rather obvious example serves to demonstrate this 
point; when seeing 11 men in blue outfits and 11 men in red ones running after a ball at 
a lawn, we see it as a soccer match. In other words; we already hold an understanding of 
what a soccer match is about, and what it takes to make a situation count as a soccer 
match rather then something else. Without this pre-understanding, or if the men ran 
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around without the outfits or the ball, the situation would either appear unintelligible or 
we would see it as something else. 
In this there are clear lines back to translation-problems, under- and over-
interpretations: Seeing as is qualitative different from seeing that, although they are both 
parts of seeing (Hanson 1972). The context, understanding and knowledge already held 
help us make sense of what we are seeing, that is «it saves us from re-identifying 
everything that meets our eye […] We do not as ‘what’s s that? ` of every passing 
bicycle» (Hanson 1972:22).  
Three components in pre -understanding 
To say that the members of different groups may have different perceptions when 
confronted with the same stimuli is not to imply that they may have just any 
perceptions at all.9 
So what are we looking through then? Gilje and Grimen (1993) discuss three 
components in an actors’ pre-understanding; language and concepts, notions and beliefs, and 
finally personal experiences.  
The concepts available through language are decisive when it comes to what we can 
see and do. In a way we see the world through concepts; they direct our observations 
and make us stress something at expense of something else. Most important here 
however is that different languages create different concepts available for the social 
actors. Thereby the social actors may have different understandings and see different 
things even though they principally are watching «the same» (Hanson 1969, 1972). 
Again we see how translational problems become particularly highlighted in 
comparative studies; a point to be illustrated by my own research. It may be obvious 
enough that US «welfare» is not translatable to Norwegian «velferd» and that we 
thereby, strictly speaking, are not comparing «the same» phenomenon. A more relevant 
question though is what we then are comparing, or how to understand the concept: As 
benefits to the poor, and if so to all poor or certain groups? As something entitled 
through citizenship? As specific programs or reforms, or eventually as an expansive and 
including state? Although TANF, one of the programs I focus on, most often is 
understood as the prototype of welfare within the US opinion, each of the above 
alternatives finds support within literature at the field… And where the majority of 
Americans see «welfare», it may happen that that I as a Norwegian see something else – 
and that this misjudging remains unsolved.  
In that way there is a «doubleness» linked to concepts. At the one hand we need 
them to be able to see and interpret the surrounding world. They are central for 
abstractions; that is seeing that something in a certain respect is common or similar, 
although   in other respects different and unique. Based on available criteria we 
distinguish important, from less important and unimportant. Concepts and pre-
understanding are thereby fundamental scientific (as well as everyday) tools. At the 
other hand the same conceptual apparatus is decisive when it comes to what we are able 
(and unable) to see and our potential interpretations of this phenomenon.  
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This leads to the question of why the societal actors hold the concept- and 
knowledge apparatus they do, and thereby to the second component discussed by Gilje 
and Grimen; notions and beliefs. The notions and beliefs hold influences upon what is 
taken for granted or regarded unproblematic and what is not. Or put another way: the 
worldviews of the social actors are «impregnated» by their understandings (Popper 
1981:88). Notions and beliefs are closely linked to political, social and cultural situations; 
a point also demonstrated by the foregoing example.  
This leads to the third component constituting pre-understanding; personal experiences. 
Basically this has to do with fa ctors such as nationality, age, gender, race, class etc. 
influence upon the thoughts and understandings of social actors. E.g. a person who 
grew up in the US will have other experiences than a person who grew up in Norway.10 
Here the way an actor meets and experiences the actions of other actors is stressed as a 
factor of special importance: For example, people will have different expectations and 
attitudes towards public officers depending on their views on what ought to be public 
versus private tasks and responsibilities (Gilje and Grimen 1993:14). The society we are 
part of (i.e. «social-democratic» versus «liberal») in other words influence strongly upon 
our notions and orientations.  
For social science research this last point represent a highly adequate challenge: 
Contextual factors influence upon the interpretative scientist as well as the actors being 
interpreted (which also have their own interpretations of the social world the scientist 
aims to get a grip on – that is a kind of double-hermeneutic). My own research serves to 
illustrate this point: If an American and myself look upon the same welfare program, for 
example TANF, we do not see «the same». Of course I will be aware of US «welfare» 
being something else than Norwegian «velferd»; an awareness that as far as possible 
should be reflected when analyzing US welfare debates. Yet I cannot be certain about in 
which extent this is possible – or exactly how welfare is understood within the US 
context.11 This uncertainty then represents potential problems for translations and 
presentations. Consequently it also represents a scientific problem that together with 
our pre-understanding as far as possible should be dealt with explicitly. 
Interactions,  ref lect ions and revisions 
     «Now your thinking is to Norwegian»12 
The foregoing discussion highlights how several factors influence upon our pre-
understandings – and thereby upon what we do and do not see. Yet, the relations 
between what is to be interpreted and the interpreter are dynamic: It is mutual processes 
where not only the social world being researched but also the presuppositions and 
biases of the researcher, are being continuously questioned and adjusted. What exactly 
characterize these interactions will of course vary among the specific research-project 
and researchers, but here in the concluding part I will nevertheless deal with these 
interactions and its relevance at a more general level. The starting point however is a 
concrete example from my research stay in New York last fall.  
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A question central for my project is whether the same welfare programs influence 
differently upon different groups of women, i.e. through criteria for being eligible or 
more indirectly through what a specific program «symbolizes». In both cases, my 
assumptions go, this will affect women’s  «space» or rooms of maneuvers towards state 
and society. Anyhow, this question did not turn out very successfully when talking with 
US researchers. Either they answered «no» or «that depends on where she lives and the 
number of children she has». I did not understand the answers; neither did they 
understand my question. First when we all understood that we did not really understand 
anything, were we able to find a common frame for interpretation: My way of thinking 
and my questions were influenced by the universal Norwegian welfare state, and from 
that generalized from some women to US women in general. On the other hand; their 
answers and ways of thinking were influences by the US welfare system with mean-
tested and restricted welfare programs. Consequently, they were thinking of a specific 
group of women (so called «welfare mothers») not being quite relevant or 
representative for US women in general.  
In linking this example to processes within the hermeneutic circle we firstly got a 
clearer picture of the interplay between our biases or pre-understandings and the social 
world to be interpreted and understood. To «meet with» the social world is in many 
ways a presupposition for clarifying the researchers initial assumptions. I.e. the initial 
misunderstandings resulted in us starting to reflect upon our concepts and ways of 
thinking. Consciousness and reflections are again necessary for being able to «adjust» 
ones initial understandings and biases.  
Secondly the example demonstrates how a hermeneutic becomes relevant within 
comparative oriented research. In relating one phenomenon to another – like 
Norwegian «velferd» and US «welfare» – we get a different understanding of both than 
if seeing them separately. In that respect, and as should be clear by now, comparisons 
are to a great extent based on differences and abstractions. Strictly speaking then we 
never compare «the same», rather we focus on phenomenons having characteristics that 
we view as important and comparable. We emphasize some aspects at the expense of 
others; that is we define some characteristics as more «important» and «relevant» than 
others. A hermeneutic approach turns out to be useful in getting grip on such processes 
and in questioning the basis for our abstractions. Simultaneously it highlights how and 
why the social scientist is unable to «equalize» own and others contexts.  
Yet, as demonstrated through the paper such a conclusion does not weaken the 
importance of comparative social research. Rather the overall aim, from what has been 
discussed here, is being conscious and explicit when trying to conceptualize ones own 
and others contexts. This also implies that being aware that the context of others cannot 
be ones own (and the other way around), regardless of eventual questioning and 
adjusting of ones own understanding, Going back to Sartori we can say that conceptual 
traveling is an important precondition for avoiding conceptual stretching.  
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Notes 
 
1 This is a translated and expanded version of my essay in theory of social science (vitenskapsteori) at 
Department of Comparative Politics, January 2003. I want to thank Petter Nafstad, Dag Stenvoll, Per 
Selle, Svanaug Fjær, Bente Nicolaysen, Stein Kuhnle, Tor Midtbø and Kari Wærness for useful comments 
on earlier versions of the essay.  
2 Hanson 1972:6 
3 See for example (1973): «Is a science of comparative politics possible?». According to MacIntyre science 
deals with general knowledge. What makes comparative politics problematic then is the character of 
concepts applied. Yet it is important to note that the aim of MacIntyre is not to demonstrate 
«impossibility» but to highlight potential obstacles: Either we are unsure or unable to confirm that the 
phenomenon we compare actually is «the same» across contexts. Or eventually, we have to do with 
human rationality in general, which in the view of MacIntyre has nothing to do with science .  
4 Of course all Americans do not have similar perceptions either, but at a more general level the argument 
goes to illustrate my points.  
5 The very system is based upon the Social Security Act (1935) and has two main components: social 
insurance and social assistance. Only the last is associated with «welfare»; referring to TANF, food stamps 
and Medicaid. Underlying social assistance is the principle of public (minimum-) support, detached from 
eventual previous contributions. In contrast social insurance is based on the principle of previous 
contributions as the basis for public transfers and services i.e. retirement pensions and medical services 
(Medicare). These are services understood as deserved rights, mainly on the basis of work participation 
(Cook and Barrett 1992). While welfare (social assistance) is a highly controversial issue, there is a 
relatively high level of support for Social Insurance in the U.S. opinion. 
6 Hanson (1972:22). 
7 From Krogh ( 2000:249) 
8 Hanson (1972:15). 
9 Kuhn (1996:195). 
10 Of course there will be differences within the U.S and Norwegian population as well.  
11 Again the argument goes as in footnote three; every comparisons – as well as general points – are based 
on abstractions. 
12 Professor in New York, September 2002 
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